“Image metaphor” is defined in Conceptual Metaphor Theory as a mapping of visual structure from one entity onto another based on the mental images they evoke. It is considered an exceptional, one-off phenomenon that can be distinguished clearly from prototypical conceptual metaphors. However, according to Perceptual Simulation Theory, all language, both literal and nonliteral, is understood partially by simulating in our minds what it would be like to actually perceive the things that are being described, which suggests that visualization is (...) not unique to image metaphor. As I argue in this article, the mental imagery invited by image metaphors is nevertheless likely to be particularly vivid, detailed, and complex, as well as involving more conscious and deliberate thought processes. Since it is hard to consider visualization in abstract terms, pictorial equivalents of image metaphors are used to support my claims. (shrink)

Journal Name: Semiotica Issue: Ahead of print.

Name der Zeitschrift: Semiotica Heft: Ahead of print.

BackgroundThe concept of ‘successful ageing’ has been a prominent focus within the field of gerontology for several decades. However, despite the widespread attention paid to this concept, its intersectional implications have not been fully explored yet. This paper aims to address this gap by analyzing the potential ageist and ableist biases in the discourse of successful ageing through an intersectional lens.MethodA critical feminist perspective is taken to examine the sensitivity of the discourse of successful ageing to diversity in societies. The (...) paper analyzes how ageist and ableist biases can manifest in the ways we conceptualize ageing, drawing on examples in the context of mental health.ResultsWe argue that the conventional approach to successful ageing is limited in its ability to account for the experiences of people who have faced intersectional discrimination throughout their lives. Drawing on examples in the context of mental health, we explore among others the link between depression and disabilities. Furthermore, we shed light on the negative impact of ageist and ableist attitudes concerning the diagnosis and treatment of dementia.DiscussionWe demonstrate how diversity is often overlooked in discussions of ageing well, and how ageist and ableist biases can manifest in the ways we conceptualize ageing. We argue that focusing solely on the health status as a means of achieving success fails to adequately counter ageism for all people. We further emphasize the role of structural factors, such as ageist attitudes, in shaping the experience of ageing and exacerbating health inequalities.ConclusionOverall, our findings emphasize the need for a more nuanced and inclusive understanding of ageing and therefore an intersectional approach to conceptions of ageing well that recognizes and addresses the biases and limitations of current discourses. Thereby, this paper offers valuable insights into the complex intersections between age and disabilities from a bioethical perspective, highlighting the need for a more inclusive and intersectional approach to ageing. (shrink)

Escuchamos hablar con frecuencia de la importancia de las competencias blandas en la educación y en el mundo laboral. Sería primordial que la educación, en todos sus niveles, se plantee un cambio de paradigma y que las incluya en los planes de estudio, dándole el mismo valor que a las competencias duras. Sería conveniente que el alumnado las desarrolle para que los prepare en el ámbito laboral y en su transitar en este mundo cada vez más cambiante. El Coaching Educativo (...) permite desarrollar estas competencias en el alumnado, un cambio de observador, un modo distinto de ser y de hacer. (shrink)

En la primera parte de esta contribución la establece los marcos del jorizone de evidencia de toda metafísica en tanto tesis del ver-saber, para enseguida reconstruir la crítica-denuncia wittgensteiniana de dicha argumentación en sus hilos conductores: la hipótesis del ojo mental, sólo pudiendo ser el objeto verdadero de la visión un objeto privado, y su corolario incuestionado en la idea del lenguaje privado, idea que debe ser suprimida al igual que la del ojo del alma por ser ilusoria. La critica (...) wittgensteiniana es presentada como la denuncia de la concepción del vínculo entre el pensamiento seña una forma de ver. En la segunda parte del artículo, la A. examina el análisis wittgensteiniano de las "vivencias de aspecto", tema fundamental de la sección xi de 1 segunda parte de las Investigaciones filosóficas. Por un lado, demuestra que la vivencia se articula como significativa desde la expresividad del lenguaje, no siendo esta última un mero "exterior" constituido desde el interior", y, por otro lado, demuestra que el ego "expresivo" no es jamás prisionero de la lengua de la que surge sino que es, por el contrario, fundamentalmente creativo. (shrink)

The purpose of this essay is to identify the theological comprehension of the Word as Creator in the action of the Trinity, which Thierry of Chartres offers in his Tractatus de sex dierum operibus. In his brief and synthetic explanation, he makes coincide the findings of human reason with biblical notions, such as Figure and splendor, Wisdom, Truth, Word, not as a mere sequence but in their deep and relational meaning. Thierry’s rational method is deductive-mathematical, whereas the philosophical premise is (...) the rerum universitas articulated in levels of necessity and possibility. All this allows creation to be considered as explication of the complicatio—or multiplicity produced by unity— which is typical of the chartrian neoplatonism, with the characteristic seal of Thierry. (shrink)

El trabajo trata, desde un punto de vista crítico, acerca del sentido del concepto muralla, en su contexto socio-político y simbólico. A propósito de la generalización a nivel mundial de murallas entre naciones, países, culturas, plantea además la existencia de murallas virtuales, como la «línea de pobreza», que marcan la exclusión de grandes sectores sociales.This work, written from a critic standpoint, is about the meaning of the concept of wall in its sociopolitical and symbolic context. Deriving from the outspreading of (...) walls all over the world between nations, countries, cultures, we pose the existence of virtual walls such as the "poverty line", which mark the exclusion of big social groups. (shrink)

Resumo: O objetivo deste trabalho é discutir o processo de inclusão de alunos com deficiência/necessidades educacionais especiais no Ensino Superior, destacando algumas questões sobre a prática pedagógica que vem sendo realizada na Universidade Estadual do Oeste do Paraná – UNIOESTE. Fundamenta-se na Psicologia Histórico-Cultural que permite compreender como ocorre o processo de desenvolvimento do sujeito a partir do estudo dos fenômenos em sua historicidade, em um processo dialético, contemplando as dimensões da totalidade. A educação desses alunos, embasada numa legislação que (...) vem se ampliando nos últimos anos, necessita, na maioria dos casos, de algum tipo de atendimento educacional especializado como apoio e complementação do trabalho docente. As práticas pedagógicas realizadas, historicamente, na maioria das universidades ainda apresentam uma concepção de desenvolvimento humano sustentada pelo caráter biológico. Compreende-se que tais orientações são coerentes com a formação de um homem que se adequa à sociedade capitalista que preconiza por uma formação unilateral, com aquisição de competências restritas e imediatas. Como resultado, espera-se refletir sobre a importância de uma prática pedagógica inclusiva, que contribua para a construção de um sujeito crítico e consciente, que possa se apropriar do conhecimento científico e concluir seus estudos com qualidade. Palavras-chave: Inclusão; Ensino Superior; Práticas Pedagógicas Inclusivas; Psicologia Histórico-Cultural. Inclusion and higher education: pedagogical practices with students with disabilities/SEN in the perspective of historical- cultural psychology Abstract: The objective of this work is to discuss the process of inclusion of students with disabilities / special educational needs in Higher Education, highlighting some questions about the pedagogical practice that has been carried out at the State University of Western Paraná – UNIOESTE. It is based on Historical-Cultural Psychology that allows to understand how the process of development of the subject occurs from the study of phenomena in their historicity, in a dialectical process, contemplating the dimensions of the totality. The education of these students, based on legislation that has been expanding in recent years, needs, in most cases, some kind of specialized educational assistance as support and complementation of teaching work. The pedagogical practices carried out, historically, in most universities still present a conception of human development sustained by the biological character. It is understood that such guidelines are consistent with the formation of a man who fits the capitalist society that advocates unilateral training, with the acquisition of restricted and immediate skills. As a result, it is expected to reflect on the importance of an inclusive pedagogical practice, which contributes to the construction of a critical and conscioussubject, who can appropriate scientific knowledge and conclude his studies with quality. Keywords: Inclusion; University Education; Inclusive Pedagogical Practices; Historical-Cultural Psychology. Inclusión y enseñanza superior: prácticas pedagógicas con alumnos con deficiencia/NEE en la perspectiva de la psicología histórico-cultural Resumen: El trabajo objetiva discutir el proceso de inclusión de alumnos con deficiencia/Necesidades Educativas Especiales en la enseñanza superior, señalando cuestiones sobre la práctica pedagógica realizada en la Universidad Estatal del Oeste del Paraná. El estudio está fundamentado en la Psicología Histórico-Cultural que permite comprender cómo ocurre el desarrollo del sujeto desde el estudio de los fenómenos en su historicidad, en un proceso dialéctico, considerando las dimensiones en su totalidad. La educación de esos alumnos, basada en una legislación que está siendo desarrollada desde los últimos años, necesita, en la mayoría de los casos, de algún tipo de atendimiento educacional especializado con el apoyo y la complementación del trabajo docente. Históricamente, las prácticas pedagógicas realizadas en la mayoría de las universidades aún presentan una concepción del desarrollo humano apoyada en la característica biológica. Se comprende que esas orientaciones son coherentes con la formación de un hombre que se ajusta a la sociedad capitalista que sigue por una formación unilateral, con obtención de competencias restrictivas e inmediatas. Como resultado, es esperado repensar la importancia de una práctica pedagógica inclusiva, que contribuya para la construcción de un sujeto crítico y consciente, que pueda apropiarse del conocimiento científico y concluir sus estudios con cualidad. Palabras Clave: Inclusión; Enseñanza Superior; Prácticas Pedagógicas Inclusivas; Psicología Histórico-Cultural. Data de registro: 14/04/2021 Data de aceite: 19/01/2022. (shrink)

¿Los pueblos indígenas de Abia Yala - América Latina se puede comprender de otra manera en nuestros tiempos? Para ofrecer una respuesta a esta pregunta se describe un proceso de comprensión basado en una aproximación intercultural a sus otredades políticas y religiosas. Se examina primero como intelectuales no-indígenas han comprendido a los pueblos indígenas desde 1492. Por el escuchar cómo las y los indígenas se autoentienden se evidencia después lo que significa concretamente la lucha por el reconocimiento de los derechos (...) indígenas y de la naturaleza en México, Ecuador y Bolivia. Luego se tematiza las teologías indígenas como motor del reconocimiento de las religiones indígenas. Se llega a la conclusión de que hay que superar por otros encuentros el malentendido de que todos los indígenas son seres humanos comunitarios que piensan y actuan de una manera cíclica mientras todos los seres humanos europeos son individualistas que piensan y actuan de una manera lineal. __. (shrink)

En esta obra emblemática y, a la vez,enigmática de la primera rnitad dei siglo XII, seha escogido como tema de estudio la condicióndei ser humano desde su origen creacional. LaSumma Sententiarum presenta ai hornbre comocreado a imagem de Dios y profundiza en lascaracterísticas de esta imagem; implicitamenteafirma la dignidad originaria dei hombre y de lamujer, en cuanto portadores, por el alma, de laimagen divina. Es un texto creacionista conrespecto ai cuerpo humano - hombre y mujer - ytarnbién respecto dei alma, (...) que considera comocreada por Dios de la nada. Aunque a vecesparece insinuar la preexistência de las almas, e!texto visto en su conjunto se inclima en favor dela · creación divina y singular de cada alma para yen cada cuerpo, excluyendo ai mismo tiempo e!traducianismo. Los contrastes que aparecen enalgunas posiciones doctrinales apoyan la hipótesisreciente de tratarse de una obra colectiva. Losresultados muestran la continuidad de la SummaSententiarum con las fuentes bíblicas y patrísticasen este tema, con algunas peculiaridades. Lasfuentes filosóficas son platónicas, aunque evidentementees un platonismo cristianizado, decorte agustinianodionisiano. (shrink)

Thierry fue canciller de la escuela catedralicia de Chartres de 1142-1150. Comentador de Boecio, su obra refleja sin embargo una síntesis personal de fuentes platónicas, neoplatónicas y aristotélicas. Está convencido del valor propedéutico de las artes liberales para la teología, dando amplia cabida también al quadrivium. Este estudio, centrado en su Tractatus de sex dierum operibus, pone de manifiesto que la causalidad es el eje de su comprensión ontológica de la realidad :desde el punto de vista filosófico, la causalidad explica (...) la existencia real de lo múltiple a partir del Uno, y en la perspectiva teológica muestra la creación como obra de Dios Uno y Trino. La causalidad implica, para Thierry, la participación y garantiza por tanto la capacidad causal de los seres naturales, con la consiguiente autonomía real en su orden, pero dependiente de la causa suprema, sin la cual nada existiría. (shrink)

La expresión veritas vitae o “verdad de la vida” significa, en Tomás de Aquino, que el hombre realiza en su vida los designios existentes sobre él en la mente de Dios. El estudio de los textos aquinianos pone de manifiesto que el sintagma veritas vitae forma parte de la “triple verdad” y se sitúa a un nivel más profundo que la virtud de la veracidad. La relación entre veracidad y “verdad de la vida” abre una perspectiva interesante que puede prestarse (...) al diálogo con los filósofos contemporáneos sobre el tema de la autenticidad.The expression veritas vitae or “truth of life” means, in the writings of Thomas Aquinas, the realization of each person’s life according to the plan of the Creator. A study of the texts shows that the syntagma veritas vitae belongs to the so-called “ three-fold truth” and is of a deeper kind than the virtue of truthfulness. For contemporary philosophers, the relationship between truthfulness and “truth of life” opens up an avenue for dialogue regarding the topic of authenticity. (shrink)

RESUMENLas clases naturales tienen un importante valor heurístico que no ha sido explorado a nivel epistémico. Una revisión crítica del concepto de “clase natural” sugerido por la teoría del Cúmulo de Propiedades Homeostáticas (HPC), desde la complejidad y la causalidad, muestra que es incompatible con las prácticas científicas, en especial las de la biología. Debido a los múltiples problemas que presenta en ese ámbito científico el concepto de ‘clase natural’ debería ser reconfigurado con el fin de estar acorde con las (...) inferencias explicativas y predictivas de la biología. Esto tendría como consecuencia un mejor entendimiento filosófico de los procesos y entidades naturales a la vez que ayudaría a resolver algunos problemas filosóficos y científicos.PALABRAS CLAVECLASE NATURAL, CAUSALIDAD, COMPLEJIDAD, PRACTICAS CIENTÍFICAS, ESPACIOS DE POSIBILIDAD EPISTÉMICOSABSTRACTNatural kinds have an important epistemic value that has not been studied due to the fact that the philosophical research has been focused on both semantics and logical aspects. I propose a critical review from causality and complexity to the concept of «natural kind» advanced by Homeostatic Properties Cluster Theory (HPC) in order to demonstrate that the kinds in the HPC style s are not supported by scientific practices such as biology. I think that a different concept of “natural kind” should be based on scientific practices in order to obtain a better philosophical understanding compared to HPC of both, natural processes and obtaining successful inferences. I hold that this epistemic approach provides us a new characterization of “natural kind” that will be useful as a unifying concept of natural phenomena, as well as for generating new spaces of epistemic possibilityKEY WORDSNATURAL KINDS, CAUSALITY, COMPLEXITY, SCIENTIFIC PRACTICES, EPISTEMIC POSSIBILITY SPACES. (shrink)

Es lugar frecuente en la bibliografía cartesiana hablar de la influencia de la filosofía estoica en su pensamiento, sobre todo en la moral. Si bien la tercera máxima de la moral de provisión constituye un punto de referencia obligado por lo elocuente de sus planteamientos, esta influencia se puede rastrear también en la correspondencia, de manera particular en la que Descartes sostuvo con la Princesa Élisabeth de Bohemia, entre cuyas cartas sobresalen las que el filósofo le dirigió en el año (...) 1645, que delatan la presencia de ideas estoicas, en especial de Epicteto y de Séneca. No obstante, lejos de ser una simple réplica de la filosofía helenista en el filósofo del Siglo XVII, se trata de un proceso de recepción muy complejo, que es tanto asimilación de esa tradición, como posición crítica al respecto. (shrink)

Draʿ Abu El-Naga I: Eindrücke Grabkegel als Elemente thebanischer Grabarchitektur. By Elisabeth Kruck. Deutsches Archäologisches Institut, Abteilung Kairo, Archäologische Veröffentlichungen, vol. 124. Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag, 2012. Pp. 167, 10 plates. €98.

RESUMENEste artículo se acerca al papel público que las religiones desempeñan en las democracias. Para ello es necesario que cultiven un doble afán. El primero, que mira hacia el exterior y sitúa a la religión católica entre el resto de esferas que definen nuestras sociedades plurales. El artículo cuestiona la tarea ética que puede ejercer esta tradición religiosa y que ha de reforzar el marco democrático en el que todas estas esferas se incluyen. El segundo, que mira hacia el interior (...) de esta religión y ocupa la mayor parte de este artículo, gira en torno a la teología feminista desarrollada por Elisabeth Schüssler Fiorenza. Su sentido crítico está transformando la identidad de los y las creyentes, los horizontes comprensivos religiosos y puede ayudar así a reforzar el papel de las democracias.PALABRAS CLAVERELIGIÓN, ESPACIO PÚBLICO, DELIBERACIÓN, HERMENÉUTICA CRÍTICA Y TEOLOGÍA FEMINISTA CRÍTICA.ABSTRACTThis article approaches the public part religions play in democracies. On the one hand, the Catholic religion has to be set amidst the rest of the spheres, which define our plural societies. In this first part, we will try to evaluate how the Catholic religion helps reinforcing the democratic frame in which it evolves. On the other hand, the largest part of this article will be devoted to the Catholic feminist theology developed by Elisabeth Schüssler Fiorenza not only as a means of changing the identity of believers and their understanding religious horizons, but also as a way of strengthening the role of democracies.KEYWORDSRELIGION, PUBLIC SPHERE, DELIBERATION, CRITICAL HERMENEUTICS AND CRITICAL FEMINIST THEOLOGY. (shrink)

In this article, we present a one-step hybrid block method for approximating the solutions of second-order fuzzy initial value problems. We prove the stability and convergence results of the method and present several examples to illustrate the efficiency and accuracy of the proposed method. The numerical results are compared with the existing ones in the literature.

Most of us create and use a panoply of non-sentential representations throughout our ordinary lives: we regularly use maps to navigate, charts to keep track of complex patterns of data, and diagrams to visualize logical and causal relations among states of affairs. But philosophers typically pay little attention to such representations, focusing almost exclusively on language instead. In particular, when theorizing about the mind, many philosophers assume that there is a very tight mapping between language and thought. Some analyze utterances (...) as the outer vocalizations of inner thoughts (e.g. Grice 1957, Devitt 2005), while others treat thought as a form of inner speech (e.g. Sellars 1956/1997, Carruthers 2002). But even philosophers who take no stand on the relative priority of language and thought still tend to individuate mental states in terms of the sentences we use to ascribe them. Indeed, Dummett (1993) claims that it is constitutive of analytic philosophy that it approaches the mind by way of language. In many ways, this linguistic model is salutary. Our thoughts are often intimately intertwined with their linguistic expression, and public language does provide a comparatively tractable proxy for, and a window into, the messier realm of thought. However, an exclusive focus on thought as it is expressed in language threatens to leave other sorts of thought unexplained, or even to blind us to their possibility. In particular, many cognitive ethologists and psychologists find it useful to talk about humans, chimpanzees, birds, rats, and even bees as employing cognitive maps. We need to make sense of this way of talking about minds as well as more familiar sentential descriptions. In what follows, I investigate the theoretical and practical possibility of non-sentential thought. Ultimately, I am most interested in the contours of distinctively human thought: what forms does human thought take, and how do those different forms interact? How does human thought compare with that of other animals? In this essay, however, I focus on a narrower and more basic theoretical question: could thought occur in maps? Many philosophers are convinced that in some important sense, thought per se must be language-like.. (shrink)

Does thought precede language, or the other way around? How does having a language affect our thoughts? Who has a language, and who can think? These questions have traditionally been addressed by philosophers, especially by rationalists concerned to identify the essential difference between humans and other animals. More recently, theorists in cognitive science, evolutionary biology, and developmental psychology have been asking these questions in more empirically grounded ways. At its best, this confluence of philosophy and science promises to blend the (...) respective strengths of each discipline, bringing abstract theory to bear on reality in a principled and focused way. At its worst, it risks degenerating into a war of words, with each side employing key expressions in its own idiosyncratic way – or worse, contaminating empirical research with a priori dogmas inherited from outmoded philosophical worldviews. In Baboon Metaphysics (2007), Dorothy Cheney and Robert Seyfarth offer an analysis of baboon cognition that promises to exemplify the very best interaction of philosophical theory and empirical research. They argue that baboons have a language of thought: a language-like representational medium, which supports the sophisticated cognitive abilities required to negotiate their complex social environment. This claim is intended to be surprising in its own right, and also to shed light on the evolution of spoken language. Because our own ancestors likely lived in a similarly complex social environment, Cheney and Seyfarth propose that the earliest humans also developed language first as a cognitive medium, and that spoken language evolved as a means to express those thoughts. There are two potential difficulties here. First, ‘Language of Thought’ (LOT) is a term of art, with much associated theoretical baggage and often comparatively little careful exposition. Thus, evaluating the claim requires getting clearer about just what LOT implies in this context.. (shrink)

Traditional theories of sarcasm treat it as a case of a speaker's meaning the opposite of what she says. Recently, 'expressivists' have argued that sarcasm is not a type of speaker meaning at all, but merely the expression of a dissociative attitude toward an evoked thought or perspective. I argue that we should analyze sarcasm in terms of meaning inversion, as the traditional theory does; but that we need to construe 'meaning' more broadly, to include illocutionary force and evaluative attitudes (...) as well as propositional content. I distinguish four subclasses of sarcasm, individuated in terms of the target of inversion. Three of these classes raise serious challenges for a standard implicature analysis. (shrink)

Gerechtigkeit ist ein ebenso bedeutsames wie umstrittenes Ideal menschlichen Umgangs.

Metaphors are powerful communicative tools because they produce ”framing effects’. These effects are especially palpable when the metaphor is an insult that denigrates the hearer or someone he cares about. In such cases, just comprehending the metaphor produces a kind of ”complicity’ that cannot easily be undone by denying the speaker’s claim. Several theorists have taken this to show that metaphors are engaged in a different line of work from ordinary communication. Against this, I argue that metaphorical insults are rhetorically (...) powerful because they combine perspectives, presupposition, and pragmatics in the service of speech acts with assertoric force. (shrink)

Recently, philosophers have discovered that they have a lot to learn from, or at least to ponder about, fiction. Many metaphysicians are attracted to fiction as a model for our talk about purported objects and properties, such as numbers, morality, and possible worlds, without embracing a robust Platonist ontology. In addition, a growing group of philosophers of mind are interested in the implications of our engagement with fiction for our understanding of the mind and emotions: If I don’t believe that (...) Anna Karenina exists, can I really pity her, or hope or desire that she extricate herself from her tragic situation? And why is there no “morality fiction,” analogous to science fiction? I suspect that philosophers have been especially comfortable thinking about fiction because it seems, at least prima facie, to employ the imagination in a way that conforms to a standard model of the mind. Specifically, contemporary philosophers tend to think of imagination as a form of mental pretense. Mental pretense can take two main forms: a cognitive attitude of supposing a set of propositions to be true (make-believe) or else an experiential state of imaging a scenario as if it were before one (imaging). Much of our pretense intertwines the cognitive and experiential modalities, of course. But both share a crucial common feature: all of one’s imaginative effort is invested in pretending that certain contents obtain. In this sense, we can understand imagination as the “offline” simulation of actual beliefs and perceptions (and perhaps other attitudes as well), where we analyze these in the normal way, as states individuated by their attitude and representational content. While I share the burgeoning interest in fiction, I want to suggest that we also have a lot to learn from poetry, and in particular from poetic metaphor. I will argue.. (shrink)

Mobsters and others engaged in risky forms of social coordination and coercion often communicate by saying something that is overtly innocuous but transmits another message ‘off record’. In both ordinary conversation and political discourse, insinuation and other forms of indirection, like joking, offer significant protection from liability. However, they do not confer blanket immunity: speakers can be held to account for an ‘off record’ message, if the only reasonable interpreta- tions of their utterance involve a commitment to it. Legal liability (...) for speech in the service of criminal behavior displays a similar profile of significant protection from indirection along with potential liability for reasonable interpretations. Specifically, in both ordinary and legal contexts, liability depends on how a reasonable speaker would expect a reasonable hearer to interpret their utterance in the context of utter- ance, rather than on the actual speaker’s claimed communicative intentions. (shrink)

We should not admit categorial restrictions on the significance of syntactically well formed strings. Syntactically well formed but semantically absurd strings, such as ‘Life’s but a walking shadow’ and ‘Caesar is a prime number’, can express thoughts; and competent thinkers both are able to grasp these and ought to be able to. Gareth Evans’ generality constraint, though Evans himself restricted it, should be viewed as a fully general constraint on concept possession and propositional thought. For (a) even well formed but (...) semantically cross-categorial strings often do possess substantive inferential roles; (b) hearers exploit these inferential roles in interpreting such strings metaphorically; (c) there is no good reason to deny truth-conditions to strings with inferential roles. (shrink)

I take up three puzzles about our emotional and evaluative responses to fiction. First, how can we even have emotional responses to characters and events that we know not to exist, if emotions are as intimately connected to belief and action as they seem to be? One solution to this puzzle claims that we merely imagine having such emotional responses. But this raises the puzzle of why we would ever refuse to follow an author’s instructions to imagine such responses, since (...) we happily imagine many other implausible things. A natural response to this second puzzle is that our responses to fiction are real, and so can’t just be conjured up in response to an author’s demands. However, this simple response is inadequate, because we often respond differently to people and events in fiction than we would if we encountered them in real life. Solving these three puzzles in a consistent way requires the notion of a “perspective” on a fictional world. I sketch an account of this intuitive but frustratingly amorphous notion: perspectives are tools for organizing our thinking, which can in turn alter our emotional and evaluative responses. Cultivating a perspective can be illuminating, entertaining, or corrupting — or all three at once. (shrink)

Metaphor is a pervasive and significant feature of language. We use metaphor to talk about the world in familiar and innovative ways, and in contexts ranging from everyday conversation to literature and scientific theorizing. However, metaphor poses serious challenges for standard philosophical theories of meaning, because it straddles so many important boundaries: between language and thought, between semantics and pragmatics, between rational communication and mere causal association. ;In this dissertation, I develop a pragmatic theory of metaphorical utterances which reconciles two (...) apparently incompatible intuitions. The first is that metaphors are vehicles for undertaking speech acts with a propositional content distinct from their conventional sentence meaning. The second is that metaphors are tools for inducing the essentially non-propositional effect of 'seeing things in a new light' or under a new aspect. These intuitions seem to be incompatible because it is assumed that only one can capture the essential function of metaphor. I propose instead that non-propositional 'seeing-as' or aspectual thought serves as the means by which speakers intend to accomplish their end of communicating content. This does not imply that speakers are not interested in and even committed to the effects of aspectual thought as well, only that it is not their sole, ultimate intention. ;In order to substantiate this proposal about how metaphor works, I develop an account of the psychological structures on which aspectual thought operates and the changes it engenders; I then show how the content of the speaker's intended speech act is determined by the aspect the sentence generates. By bringing propositional content and non-propositional aspectual thought together in this way, my account can treat the full range of metaphors, from 'ordinary' to 'poetic', within a unified theory. Armed with this account, we have the explanatory resources necessary to acknowledge both that ordinary conversational metaphors are efficient and sometimes essential vehicles for communicating determinate propositional contents, and also that rich, poetic metaphors are invitations to an open-ended contemplation of the subject under discussion. These apparently very different effects turn out to be manifestations of the same basic process of comprehension. (shrink)

On a familiar and prima facie plausible view of metaphor, speakers who speak metaphorically say one thing in order to mean another. A variety of theorists have recently challenged this view; they offer criteria for distinguishing what is said from what is merely meant, and argue that these support classifying metaphor within 'what is said'. I consider four such criteria, and argue that when properly understood, they support the traditional classification instead. I conclude by sketching how we might extract a (...) workable notion of 'what is said' from ordinary intuitions about saying. (shrink)

I argue that we can reconcile two seemingly incompatible traditions for thinking about concepts. On the one hand, many cognitive scientists assume that the systematic redeployment of representational abilities suffices for having concepts. On the other hand, a long philosophical tradition maintains that language is necessary for genuinely conceptual thought. I argue that on a theoretically useful and empirically plausible concept of 'concept', it is necessary and sufficient for conceptual thought that a thinker be able to entertain many of the (...) potential thoughts produced by recombining her representational abilities apart from a direct confrontation with the states of affairs being represented. Such representational abilities support a cognitive engagement with the world that is flexible, abstract, and active. (shrink)

Philosophers have traditionally inclined toward one of two opposite extremes when it comes to metaphor. On the one hand, partisans of metaphor have tended to believe that metaphors do something different in kind from literal utterances; it is a ‘heresy’, they think, either to deny that what metaphors do is genuinely cognitive, or to assume that it can be translated into literal terms. On the other hand, analytic philosophers have typically denied just this: they tend to assume that if metaphors (...) express any genuine content at all, then that content can in principle be paraphrased into literal terms. They often conclude on this basis that metaphor is theoretically dispensable, and so that it poses no special challenges and affords no distinctive insights for the philosophy of language and mind. (shrink)

For the last 15 years, companies have extensively increased their environmental disclosure relative to their environmental strategy in response to institutional pressures. Based on a computerized content analysis of the annual reports of the 55 largest French industrial companies, we describe environmental disclosure with respect to the different strategies implemented by companies over a period of 6 years. The results show that environmental disclosure becomes more and more technical and precise for all the companies. Environmental innovations are presented as a (...) means of increasing energy efficiency and of obtaining a competitive advantage in green market products. The environmental management system implemented by proactive companies allows them to improve their environmental performance. However, the results show that the economic situation significantly influences the way environmental issues are addressed. (shrink)

The first Ukrainian translation of Elizabeth Badenter's work "Condorcet, Prudhomme, Guyomar... Paroles d’hommes (1790-1793)".

Since the 1970s, historical sociology in the United States has been constituted by a configuration of substantive questions, a theoretical vocabulary anchored in concepts of economic interest and rationalization, and a methodological commitment to comparison. More recently, this configuration has been destabilized along each dimension: the increasing autonomy of comparative-historical methods from specific historical puzzles, the shift from the analysis of covariation to theories of historical process, and new substantive questions through which new kinds of arguments have been elaborated. Although (...) the dominant responses have centered on methodological elaboration and epistemological debate, greater attention to historical process also informs new strategies for defining cases and framing puzzles, thereby highlighting different categories of empirical questions: social caging, group formation, and multiple orders. The most striking shift is from the imagery of systems-and-crises, which highlighted revolution and state-building, to multidimensional understandings of emergence and destabilization. (shrink)

Elisabeth Porter's guide to the development of feminist thought on ethics & moral agency surveys feminist debates on the nature of feminist ethics, intimate relationships, professional ethics, politics, sexual politics, abortion and reproductive choices.

Philosophers have often adopted a dismissive attitude toward metaphor. Hobbes (1651, ch. 8) advocated excluding metaphors from rational discourse because they “openly profess deceit,” while Locke (1690, Bk. 3, ch. 10) claimed that figurative uses of language serve only “to insinuate wrong ideas, move the passions, and thereby mislead the judgment; and so indeed are perfect cheats.” Later, logical positivists like Ayer and Carnap assumed that because metaphors like..

After a long period of neglect, the phenomenology of action has recently regained its place in the agenda of philosophers and scientists alike. The recent explosion of interest in the topic highlights its complexity. The purpose of this paper is to propose a conceptual framework allowing for a more precise characterization of the many facets of the phenomenology of agency, of how they are related and of their possible sources. The key assumption guiding this attempt is that the processes through (...) which the phenomenology of action is generated and the processes involved in the specification and control of action are strongly interconnected. I argue in favor of a three-tiered dynamic model of intention, link it to an expanded version of the internal model theory of action control and specification, and use this theoretical framework to guide an analysis of the contents, possible sources and temporal course of complementary aspects of the phenomenology of action. (shrink)